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NAVIGATING THE UNKNOWN:
WHY SCOTUS OUGHT TO AGAIN AFFIRM THAT
ACHIEVING TRUE DIVERSITY IN HIGHER
EDUCATION IS A COMPELLING INTEREST THAT
SATISFIES STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN IT REHEARS
FISHER
Kenrick Frank Roberts*
INTRODUCTION

"Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent judgments
that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: 'I do not belong here." I
In her extremely passionate dissent to the majority opinion in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Supreme Court
Justice Sonia Sotomayor urged her colleagues to allow institutions to
prioritize diversity as a means to assist with dispelling assumptions
based on skin color thereby effectively preparing students for a more
diverse work force and society. 2 Seemingly, this plea to the other
Justices came from the realization that racial tensions were at a
heightened state across the nation; sadly however, those tensions were
* Communications Editor UDC Law Review, J.D. Candidate, University of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, 2016; B.A., Saint Leo
University, 2007; M.S., Nova Southeastern University, 2009. Thank you to the
members ofthe 2015-2016 UDC Law Review team for your dedication in editing this
piece. I would also like to express gratitude to Professor Philip Lee for taking the tin
to help me refine my topic and guideme throughthis process. Finally, a special thank
you to my parents for your never-ending love, support and motivation; and to my
family and friends for your encouragement and understanding throughout the past four
years oflawschool.
' See Schuette v. Coalitionto Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623,

1676 (U.S. 2014).
2 See id. at 1682-83.
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neither new nor surprising.
While Schuette did not surround the constitutionality of racebased admissions in higher education, the Court was asked to determine
whether Michigan voters could lawfully amend the state constitution to
prohibit state officials from granting race-based and other preferences
in making government decisions. 3 Thus, a determination in Schuette
was nevertheless applicable in the context of race-based admissions
decisions because such an amendment would inevitably raise certain
implications for the admissions processes at state universities in
Michigan. 4 The Court found that Michigan voters, through the very
essence of the democratic process, had a right to deliberately debate and
determine even a complex issue such as race. 5 This ruling however,
posed significant repercussions for minority groups who, historically,
were often structurally barred from influencing the political process.
This realization ignited Justice Sonia Sotomayor into a ravishing dissent
as to the adverse effects of such an amendment and its potential to lead
to the further disenfranchisement of racial minorities within higher
education.
Despite the numerous benefits of achieving true diversity in all
areas of our society, much of our history has been defined by the
struggle for racial equality. This struggle, notwithstanding numerous
strides, still continues today. One area that has garnered much attention
in relation to this topic has been the consideration of race by colleges
and universities in making admissions decisions. With advocates on
either side of the debate, it appears that regardless of various rulings in
favor of allowing race-based considerations in higher education
admissions, the debate is not yet over.
The Supreme Court of the United States has more than once
affirmed that achieving true diversity in higher education is of the
utmost importance and satisfies a compelling interest under the strictest
form of constitutional muster. 6 In 2013, the Court decided Fisher v.
University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).

In Fisher, Abigail

Fisher, a Caucasian applicant who was denied admission in 2008, sued
the University of Texas ("UT") alleging that UT's consideration of race
in making admissions decisions was discriminatory and violated her
right to Equal Protection.7 The Court held that the lower courts had
at 1630.
Id. at 1629.
1 Id. at 1638.
6 See Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (U.S. 2003).
7 See Fisherv. Univ. ofTex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (U.S. 2013).
3 Id.
4
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incorrectly utilized the strict scrutiny standard to grant summary
judgment in favor of UT. 8 This decision was based on the reasoning
that the lower courts had submitted to the university's mere assertion
that it only considered race in good faith. 9 The lower court's decision
was particularly troubling to the nation's highest Court because under a
strict scrutiny analysis, the lower court should have closely examined
the practical workings of the admissions process instead of simply
taking the university at its word. 10 Thus, the Court vacated the
judgment of the lower courts and remanded the case for a determination
of whether UT's admissions process was sufficiently narrowly-tailored
and could satisfy strict scrutiny."
On June 2 9th, 2015, the Supreme Court agreed to once again hear
oral arguments in Fisher. This decision is troubling to supporters of
Affirmative Action policies because of the Court's indistinguishable
motivation for hearing the case a second time. This Note argues that the
Court must continue to allow race-based considerations in higher
education admissions policies. Part I takes a look at the beginnings of
affirmative action and the effects of past discrimination on the
educational attainment of minorities. Part II charts the case law related
to affirmative action in higher education. Part III tracks how the
meaning of narrowly-tailored has evolved through the relevant case law.
Part IV explores the individual, educational and societal benefits of
achieving true diversity in higher education and asserts that these
benefits are paramount, especially as our society becomes increasingly
heterogeneous. The Note concludes by maintaining that in order to have
meaningful minority representation in all areas of society, it is essential
that within the. context of higher education admissions, the Court's
definition of narrowly-tailored must continue to include certain racebased considerations. Specifically, considering race as a factor, among
many, in making an offer of admission must again be deemed
constitutionally permissible.

I. BACKGROUND
Even with the Court's determination in Regents of Univ. of Cal

v. Bakke,438 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1978), that colleges and universities could
consider race in admissions decisions as long as they did not use quotas,
Id. at 2421.
* Id.
10 Id.

" Id.
181

there remains a split among federal circuit courts regarding the
constitutionality of allowing race-based considerations in university
admissions policies. 12 Although the Court made a ruling that was
relevant to the use of race conscious admissions policies in the summer
of 2013, there remains much uncertainty about whether the Court will
continue to allow admissions policies that include race-based
considerations. 13 Similar contentions regarding affirmative action in
higher education exist outside of the courts as wel Advocates for
permitting race-based considerations assert that such preferences are
imperative to achieving true diversity. 14 Those who are against
Affirmative Action policies however, argue that such policies merely
allow for discrimination in the reverse. 15 The debate surrounding
affirmative action, its legitimacy, its purpose, and its effect is not a new
one. Exploration of the reasons that these policies came to be and the
significant benefits that result from such policies, undoubtedly point in
the direction of continuing to allow Affirmative Action policies in
higher education admissions policies and the benefits that flow as a
result of these policies.
A. The Beginnings of Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is described as the efforts made to correct
injustices of the past; avenues to make right the wrongs of the past;
making up for past unfairness; steps taken to correct past
discrimination. 16 The notion of affirmative action can be linked to early
black scholars such as W.E.B. Du Bois. 17 Du Bois suggested that the
color line was the most striking 2 0 th century issue and took a united
stance with other scholars like Carter Woodson to influence the creation
of organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement
. 12 Joelle A. Marty, Comment, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:
FederalCircuitCourtSplit Over Bakke's Diversity Rationale,36 U.C. DAVIs L. REv.
505, 506 (2003).
13 MatthewN. Gaertner &MelissaHart, ConsideringClass:CollegeAccess
andDiversity,7HARV.L. & POL'Y REV. 367, 367 (2013).
14 See Marty supranote 12, at 506 (citing Jonathan R. Alger, Affirmative
Action in HigherEducation:UnftnishedHomeworkfor Universities:Making the Case
for Affirmative Action, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONT EMP. L. 73, 74 (1998)).
" See id. (citing Terry Eastland, EndingAffirmative Action: The Case For
ColorblindJustice,6-10 (1996)).
16
See BURTON'S LEGAL THESAURUS, Affirmative Action, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/affirmative+action (as ofJuly 19,2015 2:40 PM).
" Robert A. Rhoads et al., HigherEducationReform as a SocialMovement:
The CaseofAffirmative Action, THE REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 191 (2005).
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'

of Colored People ("NAACP").1 8 The purpose of such an organization
would be to represent and ensure the civil rights of people of color.1 9 In
short, affirmative action involves policies and initiatives created to
counteract institutional racism and all forms of discrimination. 2 0
As
time progressed, the term grew to encompass specific practices to
safeguard against barriers to the employment and education of
minorities and members of other protected groups. 2
Within federal policy, affirmative action first surfaced when
President John F. Kennedy, in 1961, via Executive Order 10925,
prohibited government employers from discriminating against persons
because of race (among other factors) and required that all persons be
treated equally, as both employment applicants and as employees,
irrespective of their race, creed, color, or national origin. 22
Furthermore, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was explicitly banned by the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
specifically, that act states:
[An act to] enforce the constitutional right to vote, to
confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the*
United States to provide injunctive relief against
discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize
the Attorney General to institute suits to protect
constitutional rights in public facilities and public
education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights,
to prevent discrimination in federally assisted
programs, to establish a Commission on Equal
Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes. 2 3
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced Executive
Order 11246, which prohibited Federal contractors and subcontractors
from discriminating in employment based on race, color, religion, and
national origin. 2 4 Following this move, in his speech at a Howard
18

Id. at 197.

19

Id.

RaJade M. Berry,AfflrmativeAction inHigherEducation:Costs, Benefits,
andImplementation, J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT., &FIN. MGMT., 257 (2004).
21 Id. at 259.
22 See A BriefHistoryofAffirmative Action, Univ. of
Cal., UCI OFFICE OF
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND DIVERSIT Y, http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html (as of July
20

19, 2015 2:53 PM).
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. No.88-352, 78 Stat.
241.
24

Id.
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University commencement ceremony later that year, President Johnson
stated, "You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and
then say you are free to compete with all the others, and still just believe
that you have been completely fair." 25 The speech emphasized that the
use of affirmative action programs was necessary to attaining equal
opportunity in both employment and higher education. 26
The emphasis is on opportunity: affirmative action
programs are meant to break down barriers, both visible
and invisible, to level the playing field, and to make sure
everyone is given an equal break. They are not meant to
guarantee equal results-but instead proceed on the
common-sense notion that if equality of opportunity
were a reality, African Americans, women, people with
disabilities and other groups facing discrimination
would be fairly represented in the nation's work force
and educational institutions. 27
Various justifications for affirmative action have developed over
the years. Originally, affirmative action was justified by its remedial
effects on past discrimination, the result of our country's torrid history
of discrimination against minority groups. 28 A diverse student body is
a more modem justification for permitting affirmative action policies
and practices within higher education today. 29 On the other side of the
debate, those who stand in opposition of affirmative action policies
assert that such policies create stigma against purported benefactors and
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 30 Although contention exists
surrounding these justifications, the law of the land, at least for the time
being, stands in favor of affirmative action. Although Fisher did not
preclude an institution's use of race in admissions decisions generally,

25 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard
University:
"To
Fufill
These
Rights"
(June
4,
1965),
http://www.1bjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp.
26 Affirmative Action, THE LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/
resources/civilrights 10 1/affirmaction.html?print-t (last visited Jul. 15,2015)
27

id.

28

See Marty supranote 12, at 511.

29

id.

' Id. at 512.
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the opinion hinted at the Court's preference for race-neutral admissions
processes. 31
A dozen years ago, a 5-4 majority allowed the University
of Michigan law school to give a boost to ethnic minority
applicants. But since then, Justice Samuel Alito, who
generally frowns on affirmative action, has replaced
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote the Michigan
opinion. The new swing vote on this topic is no longer
O'Connor, but Kennedy, who has registered strong
discomfort with admissions plans that afford racial
preferences to individuals. 32
This predilection is concerning for many reasons and in what follows, I
explain them.
B. Effects of PastDiscriminationon Minorities within the Context of
Education: The Achievement Gap
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (U.S. 1954), is known for
setting the foundation for later cases involving affirmative action in
higher education and related policies. Brown encompassed several
cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. In these
cases, African American students sought non-segregated public
education. 33 There were laws in each of these states that supported and
perpetuated segregationist ideals by prohibiting African American
students from attending the same schools as White students. 34 Plaintiffs
in these cases asserted that the segregated schools allowed by these
regulations were not and could not be made equal thus violating the
Equal Protection rights of African American students. 35 The Court
found that since education is one of the very pillars that support our
31 Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailoredbut Broadly Compelling: Defending
Race-ConsciousAdmissionsAfterFisher,45SETONHALL L. REv. 761, 765 (2015).

Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, Five Supreme Court cases to watchthat couki
available
at
4,
2015,
TIMES,
Oct.
L.A.
make
history,
http*//www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-oe-1004-amar-supreme-court-preview20151004-story.html?utm-content-=2015-1021+08%3Al5%3AO7&utm source=Facebook&utm term-&utm mediun-social&u
tm campaign=LawSchoolsShoutlet.
3 Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (U.S. 1954).
34 Id. at 487-88.
35 Id. at 488.
32
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government in that it provides the basis for citizens to carry out their
civic duties, when providing education to residents, states must do so on
an equal basis for al 36 Additionally, the Court agreed with plaintiffs
and found that segregated schools do, in fact, deprive equal educational
opportunities because they promote feelings of inferiority and impede
the educational development of African American students. 37
Furthermore, the Court found that there was no place for "separate but
equal" doctrine within public education. 38 Although this was a definite
win, the Court's landmark decision, dismantling the separate but equal
doctrine, did nothing for the negative effects of segregation up to this
point. The effects of past discrimination in education continue to plague
our society today.
In education, the "achievement gap" is a term used to refer to the
disproportion between groups of students as it pertains to their academic
performance. 39 The No Child Left Behind Act was the Federal
Government's attempt to counteract such disparities in the United
States' education system by decreasing the disparity between the
academic performance of African American and Hispanic students as
compared to their White peers. 40 Despite, the strides made by No Child
Left Behind however, minority students still struggle to catch up to
nonminority students in the educational attainment arena. 41 Similar
disparities are manifested in higher education as well
The National Center for Education Statistics published a study
in 2012 which showed that among individuals ages 18-24, Whites had
higher college or graduate school enrollment rates (47%) as compared
to Blacks (37%) and Hispanics (31%).42 The study also identified that
in 2004, 45% of White high school students attended a moderately or
highly selective postsecondary institution (four-year) while the same
was true for only 23% of Black and 18% of Hispanic high school

36
1
38

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494-95.
Id.

39
Achievement
Gap,
EDUC.
WEEK,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/achievement-gap/ (last updated July 7, 2011); See
REFORM
GLOSSARY
OF
EDUC.
Gap,
THE
also Achievement
http .//edglossary.org/achievement-gap/ (last updated Dec. 19,2013).
40

Id.

Id.
Terry Ross et al., HiherEducation: Gaps in Access and Persistence
Study, IES NAT'L O[R. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS
(Aug.
2012),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012046.pdf.
41

42
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students. 43 These particular statistics are significant for several reasons.
First, evidence suggests that attendance at selective and highly selective
institutions increases the likelihood of bachelor's degree completion. 44
"The positive effect of selective institutions on attainment suggests that
they have the potential to increase the graduation rates of minorities
while narrowing the persistent college completion gap." 45 Additionally,
numerous researchers have substantiated that in general, graduation
rates increase the higher the level of selectivity of the postsecondary
institution attended. 46 Furthermore, studies dating as far back as the
1970s have found that the more selective an institution is, the higher the
minority student completion rate. 47
Statistics such as these help us to infer that a lack of affirmative
action policies in higher education would lead to an even greater
decrease in minority students at selective colleges and universities and
increase White enrollment at these institutions. 48 Such results would
contribute to the vicious cycle wherein minorities are forced to attend
less-selective institutions, face a diminished likelihood of graduating,
become less likely to attend graduate school, and ultimately earn less in
their lifetime than their White counterparts. 49
II.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:

THE CASE LAW

A. DeFunisv. Odegaard
When racial classifications are enacted or enforced by states or
the federal government, such policies cannot run afoul of Equal
Protection or Due Process; as such, the Court has repeatedly held that
Id.
Tatiana Melguizo, Quality Matters:Assessing the Impact ofAttending
More Selectivelnstitutionson College CompletionRates ofMinorities,49 RES. HIGH.
43

44

EDUC. 214 (2008).

Id.
Id. at 215.
47 Id. at 217.
48 Peter Hinrichs, The Effects of Affirmative Action Bans on College
Enrollment, Educational Attainment, and the Demographic Composition of
Universities94, REV. EcoN. & STAT. 712, 719 (2012).
49 Michael A. Fletcher, Minorities andwhitesfollow unequal collegepaths,
report
says
THE
WASH.
POST
(July
31,
2013),
45
46

http //www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/minorities-and-whites-followunequal-college-paths-report-says/2013/07/31/6 Ic 18f08-f93-11 e2-8752b41d7ed If685 story.html.
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any classification based on race is "inherently suspect" and triggers
strict scrutiny.50 The Supreme Court heard the first affirmative action
in higher education case in 1974: DeFunis v. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312
(U.S. 1974). In this case, Marco DeFunis, Jr. brought an Equal
Protection claim against the University of Washington Law School
asserting that the school utilized admissions procedures and criteria that
subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his race. 51 After
DeFunis was denied admission to the law school's incoming class, he
petitioned the trial court for admission on the basis that the school's
admission policy was unconstitutionally discriminatory; the trial court
granted his petition and DeFunis matriculated at the law school in the
fall of 1971.52 The policy employed by the law school included placing
applicants into one of two categories-the applicants in one of these
categories were given consideration for admission via a separate
minority admissions program. 53 The way an applicant answered an
optional question asking them about their dominant ethnic origin was
the only basis for eligibility into the minority admissions program. 54
Applicants who identified as Black, Chicano, American Indian, or
Filipino, were treated differently than other applicants; unlike other
applicants, despite their averages on the law school's Predicted First
Year Average (an index combining the applicant's Law School
Admission Test score and grades from the last two years of college), the
applications of Black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino applicants
were not given to the Committee Chairman for summary rejection
consideration or compared to other applications. 55 In reviewing these
particular minority applications, less weight was given to the Predicted
First Year Average, which for other applicants was heavily weighted. 56
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision upon finding that the law school's policy was not
unconstitutional; by this time however, DeFunis was a second-year

so Derek Black. Comment, The Case for the New Compelling Government
Interest:Improving EducationalOutcomes, 80 N.C.L. REv. 923 (2002); See Adarand
Constructos.Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995): See also Regents ofthe Univ. ofCal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192

(1964)).
s1 DeFunisv. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974).
52 Id. at 314-15.
13Id.
54

at 320.

Id. at 320-21.

51Id. at 323.
56

Id. at 324-25.
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student at the school 57 DeFunis filed a petition for certiorari, and the
Washington Supreme Court decision was stayed until the United States
Supreme Court reached a decision.5 8 During this time, DeFunis was
allowed to continue his studies and was then in his third year of law
school. 59 The question before the Court thus became whether DeFunis'
discrimination case was now moot since he was on the verge of
graduating from law school. 60 The Court found that since DeFunis was
now in his final year of law school and already registered for the final
term he was on track to complete all degree requirements and assured
by the law school that such degree would be awarded regardless of any
finding by the Court.61 Ultimately, it was unnecessary for the Court to
reach a determination on the merits of DeFunis' discrimination claim;
accordingly, they did not.62

B. Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke
In 1978, the Court decided Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1978). This was the first case wherein the Court
scrutinized the legality of using race-sensitive policies in higher
education admissions processes. 63 The Court's decision in Bakke
satisfied dual purposes; the decision not only limited the scope of
affirmative action, but at the same time, it confirmed the need for such
policies. 64 "Bakke provided a basis both for reinforcing affirmative
action in college admissions and for unseating such policies." 65 In
Bakke, because the Medical School's entering class was sparse with
minority students, the faculty created an admissions program (a separate
but complimentary program to the school's regular admission program)
aimed at increasing minority student enrollment in the entering class
each year. 66 By the requirements of the regular admission process,
candidates with grade point averages ("GPAs") below a 2.5 were
" Id. at 315.
5 DeFunisv. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312, 315 (U.S. 1974).
s9 Id.
60
61
62

63

Id. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Joshua M. Levine. Comment. Stizma's Openinz: Grutter's Diversity

Interest(s) and the New Calculusfor Affirmative Action in HigherEducation, 94
CALIF.

L. REv. 457 (2006).
64 See Robert A. Rhoads et
al.
65

Id.

66

Regents ofUniv. ofCal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (U.S. 1978).
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rejected, one out of six applicants were invited for a personal interview,
and following the interview, candidates were graded on a scale of 1-100
by the admissions committee and interviewers. 67
Under the separate admissions program, a different committee,
made up mostly of members of minority groups, reviewed any
applications on which the applicant noted that they identified as
economically and/or educationally disadvantaged or if the applicant
noted that they wished to be considered as a member of a minority
group. 68 These applications were next reviewed by the chair of the
special committee to ensure qualifications as economically or
educationally deprived were met. 69 They were later rated by members
of the special committee on similar requirements to the regular
process-except, these applicants were not automatically disqualifie d
by not meeting the 2.5 GPA requirement. 70 Approximately one out of
five special applicants were invited to an interview, after which, the
special committee scored the applicant and presented the highest
scoring applicants to the admissions committee for consideration. 71
Allan Bakke, a White male, filed suit seeking injunctive relief
and admission to the Medical School after his application was denied
twice and applicants with lower GPAs, Medical College Admission Test
("MCAT") scores, and committee scores than him were admitted under
the special admissions program. 72 He asserted that the special program
discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 73 The Court found for Mr. Bakke stating that
the Medical School did not meet its burden of proof that even without
the special admission program; Bakke still would not have been
admitted. 74 While the Court further held that the special admissions
program was unconstitutional because it used a racial classification
(quota system), which the Court has never allowed,75 the Court also
declared that within the context of higher education, attaining a diverse
student body is a legitimate goal and is constitutionally permissible. 76

67
68
69
70
71

72

Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id.

Id.

Regents ofUniv. ofCal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1978).

73

Id.

74

Id. at 320.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 311-12.

7
76
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C. Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger
Twenty-five years later in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled on the
right of affirmative action in higher education in two University of
Michigan cases: Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (U.S. 2003) and
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (U.S. 2003).77 In Gratz, petitioners,
both Caucasian residents of Michigan, applied to the University Of
Michigan College Of Literature, Science, and the Arts and were denied
admission. 78 The University's admissions guidelines had changed
several times during the period in which Petitioner's applications were
filed; the guidelines took into account several factors including the
applicant's high school grades, standardized test scores, high school
quality, curriculum strength, leadership, and race. 79 Records also
indicated that during the relevant period, the University admitted every
qualified applicant who was African-American, Hispanic, or Native
American, whom they classified as underrepresented minorities. 80
Petitioners filed a class-action suit asserting a violation of their Equal
Protection rights, and a violation of their Civil Rights by racial
discrimination.8 1 They sought compensatory and punitive damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief to preclude the University from
discriminating on the basis of race, and an order offering admission to
one of the Petitioners as a transfer student. 82 The Court found that
because the University's most recent admissions policy awarded 20
points simply on the basis of race, it was not narrowly-tailored enough
to achieving diversity (the policy failed strict scrutiny) and was
therefore impermissible. 83
Grutterinvolved the University of Michigan Law School. Under
the recommendation of the dean, the law school's faculty endeavored to
develop anew admissions policy that would enhance the diversity of the
entering class and would be compliant to the Court's ruling in Bakke. 84
The new policy focused on academic ability and the applicant's

" Borgna Brunner and Beth Rowen, Affirmative Action History: A History
10:48 PM),
and Timeline of Affirmative Action, (July 20, 2014,

http'//www.infoplease.com/spot/affirmativel.html.
1 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
Id. at 253.
'0 Id. at 253-54.
1 Id. at 252.
82 Id.
'

83
84

Id. at 270.
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314 (2003).
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potential to influence the learning of other students.8 5 In addition to
considering the applicant's undergraduate GPA and Law School
Admissions Test ("LSAT") scores, the new policy required that the
admissions committee evaluate a personal statement, recommendation
letters, and an essay speaking to the applicant's ability to contribute to
diversity at the law school. 86 While the policy did not explicitly state
what types of diversity would garner the most consideration points, it
did reflect the law school's commitment to racial and ethnic diversity as
it made special reference to African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans whom it classified as underrepresented minority groups who
have been historically discriminated against and who would otherwise
not be meaningfully represented at the school 87
Barbara Grutter, a White resident of Michigan, applied for
admission with a GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT score of 161; she was
originally waitlisted and then denied admission. 8 8 Grutter later sued the
school and a number of school officials alleging racial discrimination
because the law school gave significant weight to race in the admissions
process which allowed some minority groups an unfair advantage. 89
Grutter sought compensatory and punitive damages, an order offering
admission, and an injunction to prohibit the law school from continuing
its racial discrimination. 90 The Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court's finding that the law school had a compelling interest in attaining
diversity within its student body 91 and that here, the law school's use of
race was narrowly-tailored enough to further their interest of diversity
in education because it took an individualized and holistic look at each
applicant to see what benefits the individual would bring to the
institution. 92 The policy was deemed constitutional because of the
innumerable benefits of having a diverse learning environment; the
Court stated, "These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." 93
In sum, Grutter not only reiterated the diversity rationale set forth in
" Id. at 315.
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Bakke, it also highlighted the value of diversity in higher education as it
pertains to non-minorities, universities, and society at large. 94
D. Fisherv. University of Texas
In Fisher v. University of Texas, following the Court's ruling in

Gratz and Grutter, the University of Texas at Austin ("'UT") reverted
to an earlier admissions process that explicitly considered race as well
as a combination of an applicant's test scores, academic performance in
high school, and a personal index which took into account the
applicant's background and what he or she could bring to the
university. 95 Fisher, a Caucasian applicant, was denied admission in
2008, and subsequently filed suit against the university and several
university officials alleging that by considering race in admissions
decisions, the school was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 96
The Court found that the lower courts had utilized an incorrect standard
to grant summary judgment in favor of the university because they had
submitted to the university's assertion that it considered race in good
faith. 97
The Court went on to vacate the judgment of the lower courts
and remanded the case for a determination of whether UT's admissions
process was sufficiently narrowly-tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. 98
As a practical matter however, the Court merely reworked the definition
of narrowly-tailored and did not affirmatively decide the legality of
UT's use of race in admissions decisions. 99 The Court did clearly assert
however that the lower courts could not merely defer to UT's assertions
of good faith and instead had to properly analyze the practicality and
With no
results of the policy for strict scrutiny compliance. 100
definitive ruling on the legality of UT's race-sensitive admissions
process, much is left unsettled as to how the Court will rule in future
higher education affirmative action cases. This raises several concerns
as current race-sensitive admissions policies have worked to the benefit
of many minorities in higher education.
9 Levine, supra note 63.
* Fisher,133 S. Ct. at 2416.
96 Id. at 2417.
9 Id. at 2421.
98 id.

99 John C. Brittain, Affirmative Action Survives Again in the Supreme Court
on a Legal Technicality:An Analysis ofFisherv. University ofTexas at Austin, 57
How. L.J. 963, 977 (2014).
100 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2412.
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When the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reheard Fisher in 2014, UT's admission policy was again upheld. 101
Opponents argued that because UT could achieve diversity through the
state's Top Ten Percent Plan (provides automatic admission to any
public university in Texas to students in the top ten percent of their high
school graduating class), allowing race-based considerations in the
admissions policy was unnecessary. The appeals court noted however
that the mere possibility that UT could achieve some diversity through
the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan did not preclude the university from
doing more than considering numbers to achieve the aim of increased
diversity. 102 This was especially true considering that the plan works as
a result of segregation. 103 The court stated specifically, "Indeed, as
Grutter teaches, an emphasis on numbers in a mechanical admissions
process is the most pernicious of discriminatory acts because it looks to
race alone, treating minority students as fungible commodities that
represent a single minority viewpoint." 104 Furthermore, by granting
automatic admission to students at the top of their graduating class, the
Top Ten Percent Plan only superficially yields an increase in minority
enrollment because as a practical matter it causes a surge in resegregation where large numbers of minority students attend schools
that have high minority enrollment. 10 5
The Supreme Court decided in 2015, to rehear Fisher; this
concerns some Affirmative Action proponents because it presents an
opportunity for the Court to restrict or prohibit altogether any race-based
considerations in higher education. 106 That the Court has agreed to
rehear the case just a few years after it sent it back to the Circuit Court
is not a common practice and thus disconcerts many as this might be an
indication of the Justices' desire to make a significant change to the
current law of the land.107 Affirmative Action supporters take comfort
in knowing that Abigail Fisher has graduated from college, and in their
view, Fisher, at this juncture, lacks standing to continue to bring the
case. 0 8 Civil and Human Rights activists across the nation continue to
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be bewildered by the Court's decision to rehear Fisher. The Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights had this to say,
Our nation's colleges and universities play a critical role
in preparing our children for a diverse, increasingly
competitive global workforce. They need to have every
tool at their disposal to create the kind of learning
environment that will give our kids the best shot of
success in a competitive

21st century economy... The

University of Texas's admissions policy is a carefully
crafted one that is designed to create the diverse learning
environments that are critical to the educational success
of all students. 109
To date, the Court has opined that the definition of narrowly tailored
within the context of higher education can include some race-based
considerations. Furthermore, without some race-based considerations
being allowed in college admission processes, there will never be an
equal playing field for minority students, and the benefits of achieving
true diversity in higher education, and ultimately in our society, will go
unrealized.
III. DEFINING NARROWLY-TAILDRED

THROUGH THE

CASE LAW

The Supreme Court has more than once upheld achieving true
diversity in higher education as a compelling interest to allow racebased considerations in college and university admissions. "In all three
of the major higher-education affirmative action cases decided by the
Supreme Court-Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher- affirmative action
managed to endure, though with limitations." 110 Furthermore,
The Supreme Court has adopted a broad notion of the
compelling interest in diversity, allowing universities
to incorporate race-consciousness in their educational
missions in various ways. The Court has given
deference to universities in defining their educational
109
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CONFERENCE

(2015),

missions, while specifically noting educational goals
that directly implicated race: lessening racial
stereotypes, facilitating cross-racial dialogue, and
mitigating feelings of isolation and tokenism among
minority students. 111
At this juncture, however, that the Court has remained silent as to its
reasoning for rehearing Fisher under the current circumstances, it is
hard to even attempt to predict the Court's ruling when it rehears the
case in the fall of 2015. What we do have to help guide our predictions
however are the past decisions of the Court in describing the parameters
of narrowly-tailored for purposes of satisfying strict scrutiny.
In Bakke, the Court blatantly struck down the use of quotas in
admissions decisions even where those decisions were based on
The Court
attempts to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
asserted,
Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the
faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as
victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered. To
hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy
heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a
privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation
could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are
perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is
a step we have never approved. 112
The Court did acknowledge, however, that a university is allowed
certain deference in judgment as to whom to accept and cited Sweezy v.
New Hampshire,354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957), which held that,
It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which
there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
...Harpalani,supra note 31, at 772.
112
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university

-- to determine for itself on academic

grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.113
The Court further noted that even though a university has some
discretion in selecting its student body, the rights of an individual cannot
be overlooked in that process.11 4 In essence, the consideration of race
alone is unconstitutional, but considering race as one of multiple factors
in making an admission determination is permissible, "The diversity
that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is
but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity."1 5
Similarly, in Gratz and Grutter, the Court found that
automatically awarding points solely for race or ethnicity was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court declared, however, that a
holistic view of an applicant, a view based on a variety of factors,
including race, satisfied constitutional muster.
We find that the Law School's admissions program
bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. As
Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly
individualized consideration demands that race be used
in a flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this
mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for
members of certain racial groups or put members of
those groups on separate admissions tracks. See id., at
315-316, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Nor can
universities insulate applicants who belong to certain
racial or ethnic groups from the competition for
admission. Ibid. Universities can, however, consider
race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the
context of individualized consideration of each and
every applicant. Ibid. 116
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The Gratz Court found that the awarding of points merely for race was
unconstitutional because of the amount of weight given to that particular
factor. 117 By awarding twenty points just based on the race of an
applicant, race became a determining or decisive factor in the
university's decision to make an offer of admission. 118 This was
unacceptable in the Court's view.
The Court determined that the consideration of race in making
admissions decisions was different in Fisher. In contrast to the Gratz
policy, the policy in Fisher looked at race as one of a multitude of
factors as the university attempted to create a student body that could
reap the benefits of a diverse learning environment.11 9 In making its
admissions decisions, the university included in its consideration factors
suggesting that an applicant could contribute positively to the overall
diversity of the university-these factors stretched beyond race to
include whether the applicant spoke multiple languages or was a firstgeneration college student; additionally, the policy did not allocate a
certain percentage of the overall possible points unlike the policy in
Gratz. The Court found that these distinctions met the requirements of
strict scrutiny. "UT Austin's consideration of an applicants' unique
contribution to the diversity of the university steers away from
wholesale notions of diversity that primarily relies on race, as did the
scheme upheld in Grutter."l20 The inference from this holding is that,
"Race can only be used "as one of many "plus factors"' to determine
'the overall individual contribution of each candidate." Holistic,
individualized review is thus necessary [to] thoroughly consider all of
the contributions of each applicant, not just race;"121 but this holding did
not blatantly bar the use of race in admissions policies.
This stipulation that each applicant be reviewed on an individual
basis with the use of race among other factors, are the very crux of racesensitive admissions policies that have been deemed constitutional. 122
Accordingly, the compelling interest in diversity as established in
Grutter and Fisher compliments the Court's principles of narrowly
tailored-the Court's validation of admissions policies that are raceconscious and holistic.1 2 3
"1 Shenita Brazelton, Affirmative Action in HigherEducation;Fisherv.
UniversityofTexas atAustin (2013), JUST. Sys. J. 369 (2013).
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IV.

BENEFITS OF ACHIEVING TRUE DIvERsrfY

Proponents of affirmative action in college admissions can point
to many benefits of diversity to the educational environment; these
benefits have been affirmed by the Court in several cases as well,
Additionally, in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, the Court
also gave deference to universities in defining their
own educational missions
to incorporate the
compelling interest in diversity. This deference, in
conjunction with the specific educational benefits of
diversity espoused by the Court, allows universities to
define and implement their educational missions in a
manner that facilitates defense of race-conscious
admissions. They can take advantage of the broadlydefined compelling interest in diversity and narrowly
tailor their race-conscious policies and programs to
various aspects of this diversity interest. 124
There is ample research to support the assertion that racial
diversity in an educational context yields several benefits for students at
all educational levels. 125 These benefits span the areas of better
teaching and learning, improved civic values, increased employment
opportunities,
and higher achievement and more educational
opportunities for both minority and non-minority students.1 2 6 From a
large-scale effect point of view, in order to prepare our emerging
generations of leaders for continuing social progress there must be a link
between diversity and our educational and civic goals. 127 There is
theoretical support for the link between college diversity and the
development of a student's learning and democratic skills.1 2 8 As such,
it is important that we recognize our combined differences as an
essential part of democracy, promote working with a diverse array of
people and points of view, and readily adapt to our changing society. 129
Furthermore, we must encourage college students to become advocates
124
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of social justice and representatives of responsible citizenry. 13 0 "Racial
diversity also furthers another goal of colleges and universities:
preparing students for active participation in our pluralistic and
democratic society."131 As our country continues to become racially
heterogeneous, the importance of understanding and being able to
operate effectively with racial diversity is vital to education. 132 An
educational setting that is racially diverse aids students in their
understanding and resolving conflict surrounding varying perspectives
and more readily find common ground in the midst of differing
perspectives. 133
Most people will agree that colleges and universities are
responsible for developing students who are knowledgeable, skilled,
and competent enough to actively participate in society.1 34 With the
rapid changing of our society, the value of diversity is evident from an
individual, institutional, and societal standpoint.
Although there has been a nationwide increase in the number of
students of color at colleges and universities, racial diversity in higher
education has decreased as a result of ordinances that work against
affirmative action as well as numerous other roadblocks encountered by
minority students who attempt to navigate higher education.1 3 5 These
barriers that prevent minority students from accessing higher education
can sometimes be foundational and include enrollment in inadequate K12 school systems,1 36 often leading to poor preparation for college.
Research has substantiated that diversity enhances a student's
progression in the areas of cognitive, affective, and interpersonal
development. 137 "Engagement in a racially diverse student body is
associated with multiple benefits, including enhanced civic interest, bias
reduction, critical thinking,
interracial friendship, and overall
38
satisfaction with college."l
Additionally, the benefits of diversity in
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higher education extend far beyond the benefit to those who receive an
advantage as a result of such policies.
This educational benefit is universal in that all students
learn from it not just minority students who might have
received a "bump" in the admissions process. Indeed,
majority students who have previously lacked
significant direct exposure to minorities frequently
have the most to gain from interaction with individuals
of other races. The universality of this benefit
distinguishes the diversity rationale from the rationale
of remedying discrimination, under which minority
students received special consideration to make up for
past injustices to their racial group. 139
Individuals benefit from interactions with diverse information, ideas, and
people while they are in collage. 14 0 "Students who have been exposed to
greater diversity are more likely to show increases in racial
understanding, cultural awareness, and appreciation, engagement with
social and political issues, and openness to diversity and challenge. They
are more likely to exhibit decreases in racial stereotyping and levels of
ethnocentrism." 141
Furthermore, research evidences that diverse
interaction in college helps to decrease the cycle of segregation that
currently perpetuates American society.142 "In fact, racial diversity in
higher education creates the exact variables that research has determined
are vital in developing the critical thinking that is expected of
students." 143
Regarding these educational benefits of diversity, Justice
O'Connor stated in Grutter, "These benefits are "important and
laudable," because "classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting" when the students have "the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds." 44 Justice O'Connor noted
similar benefits in contexts outside of education as well, "These benefits
are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made
clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can
139
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only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints." 14 5 It is also imperative that this form of exposure
takes place in college, if not sooner, "Because of the severity of
residential segregation, colleges and universities are the only place most
people can gain these skills and get exposure to diversity. Thus, it is
incumbent upon universities to meet the challenge of engaging students
intellectually by providing the diverse setting that students need." 1 4 6
Organizations (and institutions) stand to benefit from diversity as
well.
Researchers who have studied the impact of diversity on
organizations found that diverse organizations recruit the best human
talent, improve their marketing strategies, grow their creativity and
innovation, solve problems more efficiently, and have greater
flexibility. 147 Similarly, research involving the effects of having a
diverse faculty at an institution indicates that female faculty and faculty
of color increase institutional capabilities in the areas of research,
teaching, and service. 14 8
Society at large stands to benefit from increased diversity
49
also.1
Research indicates that affirmative action in employment has
yielded a decrease in job discrimination, lessened wage disparity,
heightened
occupational
occupational
segregation,
minimized
aspirations for women and people of color, and increased organizational
productivity. 150 Further research suggests that students of color in
particular, pose a benefit to our society as a result of their increased
levels of community service and their service to medically underserved
15
populations.s
"Studies of practice patterns of physicians indicate that
doctors of color are more likely to practice medicine in areas with
populations that have the greatest need for health services in our
society."1 52 These areas include low-income urban and rural locations,
locations with high populations of people of color, populations that rely
on Medicare, and populations without health insurance.1 5 3 Benefits such
as these have also been underlined by the Court in prior opinions, "We
have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing
students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to
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"sustaining our political and cultural heritage" with a fundamental role
in maintaining

the fabric of society".

154

The Court said further,

"Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in
the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation,
indivisible, is to be realized."1 5 5
The most obvious benefit of diversity in higher education goes
to those who benefit individually from such policies, but the coming
generation has a future interest in race-sensitive admissions policies in
college and university admissions as well.
Affirmative action... is effective in producing a cadre
of black professionals who canform a nucleus of group
leaders and serve as role models for other members of
the group, especially the young who need to have high
aspirations and confidence that others have succeeded
despite their common legacy of group disadvantage.
This rationale ... applies most strongly to the domain

of higher education.1 56
CONCLUSION

Throughout her Schuette dissent, Justice Sotomayor stressed
that years of societal perpetuation of racial inequality has produced
serious societal disparities. 157 She referenced Justice Ginsburg's dissent
in Gratz, highlighting that centuries of inequality have resulted in
disparities in communities, schools, employment, poverty, health care,
etc. 158 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor concluded her dissent by
tasking the Court to "speak openly and candidly on the subject of race,
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects
of centuries of racial discrimination." 1 59 She went on to remind the
Court of its recognition of the great importance of diversity in
education,1 60 and urged her colleagues to allow institutions to prioritize
diversity as a means to assist with dispelling assumptions based on skin
color thereby effectively preparing students for a more diverse work
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force and society. 16 1 Today, we must present these same requests to the
Court as it rehears Fisher.
Racial discrimination both past and present has contributed to
the educational achievement gap of minority students in higher
education. This has led to further minority marginalization in other
areas including employment and political influence. The Court has
affirmed time and time again that diversity in higher education is of the
utmost importance and that universities must be afforded some
deference in selecting their student bodies. Therefore, in order to have
meaningful minority representation in higher education and in society
at large, it is imperative that some race-based considerations continue to
be allowed in college admissions policies. The Court must continue to
allow race-sensitive admissions policies in higher education for a cadre
of important reasons.
Race-sensitive admissions policies will facilitate increased
minority access to highly selective institutions, strengthen the
graduation probability for minority students, and significantly increase
minority earning potential. The reward that will stem from the Court
continuing to allow such policies will be multifaceted. Universities will
achieve truly diverse student bodies and the learning experience will be
enhanced for all students not just those from minority backgrounds or
who directly benefit from affirmative action policies. Additionally, the
educational environment afforded by diverse classrooms will lead to
more engaged citizens who are prepared to meet the demands of our
rapidly evolving society.
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